Whereof One Can Speak šŸ‡ŗšŸ‡¦

Nothing special, one post at a time since 2012

Goodbye Norms, Hello Power

Ezra Klein points out that when Senator McConnell refused to have the Senate consider a Democrat’s Supreme Court nomination and then rushed through a Republican’s, nothing he did was “against the rules”. That doesn’t mean Washington is the same as before:

McConnell … didn’t steal any seats. Nothing he did was against the rules, which was why Democrats found themselves powerless to stop him. Liberals, in their anger, have too often ignored the logic of McConnell’s actions. He understood what too many have ignored: America’s age of norms is over. This is the age of power. And there’s a reason for that.

Let’s start here: The Supreme Court has changed. In the ’50s and ’60s, you would have had a hard time inferring a justice’s political background from his votes, as this analysis by Lee Epstein and Eric Posner shows. In the ’90s, Byron White, a Democratic appointee, had a more conservative voting record than all but two of the Republican-appointed justices — Antonin Scalia and William Rehnquist. John Paul Stevens, an anchor of the court’s liberal wing until his retirement in 2010, was appointed by Gerald Ford, a Republican.

But this record of independence was understood, by the parties that produced it, as a record of failure. The vetting process by which nominees are chosen was revamped to all but guarantee ideological predictability. In recent years, ā€œjustices have hardly ever voted against the ideology of the president who appointed them,ā€ Epstein and Posner find.

… Ideological polarization is colliding with America’s peculiar political institutions…. Our political system is not designed for political parties this different…. It wasn’t designed for political parties at all. The three branches of our system were intended to check each other through competition. Instead, parties compete and cooperate across branches, and power in one can be used to build power in another — as McConnell well understood.

The Supreme Court is a strange institution — the final word on the law, but with no way to enforce its decisions; clearly political, but supposed to stand above politics; composed of nine bickering individuals, but posing as the impartial voice of the Constitution — and we have papered over its peculiarities with traditions of continuity and restraint. We ask senators to judge nominees by their qualifications, not their ideas. We ask justices to uphold past decisions they believe are wrong, even immoral. At least, we did. In recent years, the political importance of the court has overwhelmed the norms that (somewhat) insulated it from politics.

As I wrote: ā€œThere is perhaps no single vote members of the U.S. Senate take with as much long-term ideological importance than that of a lifetime appointment to the Supreme Court, and asking them to keep that vote, and that vote alone, separate from the ideological promises they make to their voters, and to themselves, is bizarre.ā€ The old norm worked when party conflict was mild enough to create a court that felt, and perhaps was, largely nonpartisan. But those days are long gone.

Making matters worse is that the Supreme Court has gone from being undemocratic to being anti-democratic. Lifetime appointments are iffy under the best of circumstances, but the vagaries of retirements and deaths have given Republicans a control that makes a mockery of the public will. Five of the court’s six Republican justices were appointed by presidents who initially took office after losing the popular vote (and, in the case of George W. Bush, after a direct intercession by five of the court’s conservatives in Bush v. Gore). D____ T____ was able to make more appointments in one term than Barack Obama was able to make in two.

You might think that the minoritarian nature of this Supreme Court would produce a restrained majority, one fearful of falling too far afoul of public opinion. It has not. To read the flurry of decisions and concurrences and dissents in Dobbs is to read less about abortion and rights than you might expect. Much of the text is a debate over the legal principle of stare decisis, which directs the court to respect precedent when making decisions.

Stare decisis helps solve a particular problem for the Supreme Court, which must prove itself an institution operating across time, not simply an amalgamation of nine voices at any given moment. When it resists the impulse to overturn past decisions, the court builds in a continuity beyond what the opinions of its members would offer.

Roe was already revisited, in the 1992 Casey decision, and left mostly standing. Under the norms that have governed the court for decades, Roe should have been safe, not because the majority agrees with it today, but because the Supreme Court does not upend settled law based on what the majority believes today.

This is the subject of Chief Justice John Roberts’s disappointed concurrence. ā€œSurely we should adhere closely to principles of judicial restraint here, where the broader path the court chooses entails repudiating a constitutional right we have not only previously recognized, but also expressly reaffirmed applying the doctrine of stare decisis.ā€ The dissent of the liberals thrums with even deeper anger: ā€œHere, more than anywhere, the court needs to apply the law — particularly the law of stare decisis.ā€

But stare decisis, as the justices know far better than I do, is not a law. And so, in his majority opinion, Samuel Alito brushes it aside….

The argument Alito makes throughout his opinion is simple: The court can err. When it has erred, it must correct itself. Make all the fancy arguments about stare decisis you want, but if a decision is wrong, then it’s wrong, and it must be revisited. To take his perspective for a moment: There is something maddening about being appointed to a seat on the land’s highest court but told to leave standing the decisions you and four of your colleagues consider most noxious.

On some level, he is right. Stare decisis makes little sense. The problem is that, without it, the Supreme Court itself makes even less sense. It is just nine costumed political appointees looking for the votes they need to get the outcomes they want. And the further we travel down that road, the more the mystique that sustains the court dissolves. There is no rule, really, that the Supreme Court must be obeyed as the final word in constitutional interpretation — that, too, is a norm, and one that the court has no power to enforce. If all the Supreme Court is left with are the rules, soon enough there will be no Supreme Court to speak of.

So what would it look like to rebuild the rules and norms of the Supreme Court so they made sense in a polarized era — so that it could be an institution that moderated our political conflicts, rather than worsening them? It got little notice, but there was, recently, a thorough and important effort to think through that question. It will be the subject of next week’s column.

Unquote.

If what Mr. Klein says in his next column is worth sharing, I will.

If Biden Knew Now What He Didn’t Know Then

If a Democrat as audacious as Mitch McConnell was president, they’d point out we increased the size of the Supreme Court to 9 justices in 1869 because there were 9 federal judicial circuits. The population was 38 million. Now that there are 13 circuits and the population is 338 million, the president would say we need 13 justices. The president would deny any other motive and Democrats would immediately add 4 Democrats to the Court. But that’s not the president we have.

How bad is it? How bad will it get? Brian Beutler of Crooked Media lays it out in an edition of his Big Ten newsletter:

Sometimes I wonder what would happen if we could travel back in time to 2019 or early 2020 and tell Joe Biden he’d be the next president, but that under the governing approach he’d laid out for primary voters—pro-filibuster, anti-court reform, conciliatory to a fault with the GOP—he’d oversee the abolition of the right to abortion, the hollowing out of the regulatory state, the imposition of an imaginary constitutional right to concealed carry, the disintegration of his policy agenda, an inability to marshal a federal response to a violent coup, and perhaps, right before his re-election campaign, the constitutionalization by five rogue Supreme Court justices of the January 6 strategy to steal elections for Republican candidates. 

What if anything would he do or say differently? … If Biden had rethought his institutionalism, what different steps would he have taken to rally Democrats around a new and (by necessity) more partisan approach to governing, to insure against rapid democratic backsliding and maybe even the end of the republic?

The answer may actually be ā€œnone.ā€ All of these things have come to pass, and Biden still at least claims faith in the institutions that are steering the country toward an authoritarian takeover. 

But I suspect this is not the presidency Biden wanted or imagined for himself. I think he really did want to save the country … and preside over an American renewal. I think (because nothing else really makes sense) that he drove himself into a cul-de-sac by running on the idea that his victory would largely solve these problems automatically, that retrofitting the country’s democracy wouldn’t require using carrots and sticks and tireless persuasion to change what it means to be a Democrat. That as a calm, unimpassioned figure, his mere presence would quiet national unrest and refasten the bonds that used to hold the country together. By the time he realized he’d handed Joe Manchin and Kyrsten Sinema all the justifications they’d need to stand in the way of responding to new threats, it was too late.

Obviously this is a multi-layered counterfactual, of limited probative value. Maybe if Biden had been open to more procedurally radical ideas, he would’ve lost the election; maybe no amount of cajoling from the leader of the party—no matter how early and heartfelt and persuasive—would’ve changed what Manchin and Sinema thought they could get away with. If you’re intent on concluding that Biden played a bad hand perfectly, and we were always destined for the abyss, it isn’t hard to reason your way there.  

But the problems swallowing Biden’s presidency were easily foreseeable. For one thing, I foresaw them! In October 2019, I wrote that candidates who cling, like Biden, ā€œto the view that a golden era of compromise will dawn once T____ is gone… will lock themselves into a mode of governing that can not work anymore. Their supporters and intra-party critics will be demoralized, their presidencies will stagnate, and they will waste precious time grasping for a better approach.ā€

Around the same time, I pleaded with Democrats to begin leveling with their voters about the dangers of the Supreme Court, and the need to dilute its power, because, ā€œIf Dems don’t preemptively expand the courts, Republican judges, with their lifetime appointments, can simply wait until the elected branches are divided again and then implement the disastrous judicial agenda they’ve been building toward for 40 years.ā€

That actually proved a little optimistic, because what happened in reality is those justices waited until the Democratic Congress gave the high sign that it would under no circumstances intervene to check them, and they got to work right away….

Obviously we can’t go back to 2019 to travel roads not taken, we can only move forward from where we are. That’s why I’ve been going on for months about what Democrats should do if and when the Supreme Court overturns Roe v. Wade. Well, that happened a week ago now, but the simple idea remains the same: Level with voters about the party’s current limitations, stemming from its narrow majorities, and make a simple promise to codify Roe as a first order of business next year if voters manage to give them two more Senate seats and a House majority. 

…but at the same time I know that even on the off chance that this strategy works out perfectly—that Democrats make the midterms a referendum on Roe, and win the majorities they need to codify it—we’ll still be plagued by those earlier failures. 

Without movement to reform the courts, it’s easy to see how a hard fought victory could turn pyrrhic. If Dems codify Roe in January 2023, without taking any steps to insulate it from the illegitimate judiciary, I give it a few weeks before Republicans find a corrupt judge, probably a T____ judge, to enjoin it nationwide on some laughable pretext. I’d give it better-than-even odds that this same Supreme Court would make up a basis for voiding it. 

That doesn’t mean the thing I keep badgering Democrats to do isn’t worth it….It’s easy to get yourself spun up about how things might go wrong, and then use the likelihood of future setbacks as an excuse to do nothing now. Even if Democrats never get that court-reform religion, codifying Roe next year would be better than retreating tactically. If a judge enjoins it, that’s a new opportunity for the same Democratic majority to consider checking and balancing the judiciary.

But Democrats aren’t going to get there so long as the Democratic president is aggressively opposed to expanding the court. The Dobbs ruling didn’t change their minds, the subsequent opinion stripping EPA of the power to regulate climate pollution didn’t change their minds. Why would a ruling that voids the Women’s Health Protection Act change their minds? Their minds will start to change when the leadership stops being scared of going to war with the courts. I gather they’re scared that if they blur the abortion issue with the cause of court reform, the public will reject it. But the thing to do then isn’t to say ā€˜I’m not for expanding the court,’ it’s to say the court has lost its legitimacy, and it needs to be restored one way or another.

I guess what I’m trying to get across is that it’s critically important for Biden and Dems to understand what has happened to them, why it happened, and to abandon the disastrous thinking that led them here. 

Personally, I think someone with Biden’s ear should tell him he’s perhaps four months away from going down in history as the president who lost democracy without throwing even a half-hearted punch.

On Friday, this same rotten court announced that it will hear a case that was cooked up specifically to constitutionalize the GOP’s January 6 strategy for stealing elections. Needless to say, if the Alito 5 rule the way D____ T____ wants them to rule (and they very well might) that’s likely game over for the republic.

And the worst part is, that isn’t the kind of wreckage that Democrats can fix by codifying this or that. Democrats have to expand the Court before these ghoulish justices hear or decide that case, or they will corrupt the 2024 election, and we’ll likely never get another chance.

Mr. Beutler continues here.

“One of the Most Intellectually Dishonest and Poorly Argued Decisions in American Judicial History”

So writes Saul Cornell, professor of history at Fordham University and the author of “A Well-Regulated Militia: the Founding Fathers and the Origins of Gun Control in America”:

In a 6–3 decision …, the Supreme Court struck down New York’s century-old gun law against concealed carry on [June 23rd]. New Yorkers and residents of a handful of other states and the District of Columbia—which had more strictly regulated who can have a concealed-carry permit—must now accept the type of laws popular in Texas and other red states. The decision was hardly a surprise to court watchers, but the opinion is nonetheless troubling on many levels.

The fact that this opinion was written by Justice Clarence Thomas, an originalist so rigid in his thinking that Justice Antonin Scalia once used him as a foilĀ to distinguish his respect for precedentā€”ā€I’m an originalist and a textualist, not a nut,ā€ Scalia quipped— contrasting the burn-it-all-down approach favored by his laconic colleague. Thomas has long been a proponent of supersizing the Second Amendment and has argued—against strong statistical evidence—that lower courts were treating the Second Amendment as a second-class right.

Thomas and his fellow originalists have set out to analogize the Second Amendment to core free speech rights, a bizarre legal analogy with little foundation in either legal history or tradition. In fact, guns have generally been treatedĀ as a form of property under American law for more than three centuries,Ā a fact that appears to have escaped the notice of Thomas and the court’s newest originalists despite their professed commitment to an interpretive approach that focuses on history, text, and tradition.

Ultimately, the majority opinion inĀ NYSRPA v. BruenĀ is one of the most intellectually dishonest and poorly argued decisions in American judicial history. Indeed, with little sense of irony, Thomas even quotes Chief Justice Roger B. Taney’s infamous opinion inĀ Dred ScottĀ approvingly, not only treating it as good legal authority but suggesting that the author of the worst decision in American law understood the Second Amendment better than any other judicial figure in American history. Turning to Taney for judicial inspiration would have once ended a judge’s career, but the court’s new originalist majority appears most of the time to be making history by inventing it, instead of by interpreting the law.

The old originalism of Robert Bork and Chief Justice William RehnquistĀ sought to use history to constrain judicial discretion and activism.Ā The new originalismĀ favored by Thomas and his fellow originalists has embraced judicial activism on steroids. Indeed, the court’s current use of originalism more clearly resembles an act of ventriloquism in which old texts are pressed into the service of modern agendas with little regard to how they were read at the time they were written. The new originalism, including theĀ BruenĀ decision, turns historical actors into little more than stage dummies for the justices to project their own modern values and ideas onto the past.

One of the most remarkable features of Justice Stephen Breyer’s trenchant dissent inĀ BruenĀ is his frank assessment of the appalling quality of the history being pedaled by his colleagues. Calling out the justices for engaging inĀ ā€œlaw office history,ā€Ā a degraded form of legal analysis that warps history to fit the desired ends favored by a judge or justice, is something scholars have criticized the courts—including the Supreme Court—for practicing with some frequency. Still, it is unprecedented for a serving justice to hurl this type of accusation at colleagues sitting on the bench, and Breyer did just that. It is hard to dispute Breyer’s characterization of his colleagues given thatĀ Bruen is an opinion filled with legal and historical errors that all cut in the same direction, expanding gun rights by rewriting the American past.

To illustrate the shocking and amateurish use of history inĀ Bruen, one need only examine the way Thomas ignored and distorted the evidence of robust gun regulation during Reconstruction, the period of history that he and other originalists have claimed is the key to understanding the scope of legitimate gun regulation by states and localities. Thomas reluctantly conceded that Reconstruction-era Texas had laws of similar scope to New York’s challenged laws. Yes, once upon a time Texas led the nation in enacting strong gun regulation!

Thomas, though, falsely claimed Texas was an outlier and, hence, that its evidence could be discarded. Similarly, Thomas discounts strong gun regulations in the Western United States because these too were unrepresentative outliers. In the Thomas originalist universe, apparently no amount of evidence is enough to support gun control, but no amount of evidence is too little to legitimate gun rights claims. In fact, millions of Americans were living with gun laws at least as restrictive as the New York law at issue inĀ BruenĀ for many years during the period of history Thomas contends is crucial to understanding the application of the Second Amendment to states and localities.

Just looking at the history of firearms law in nation’sĀ largestĀ cities undermine the central claim inĀ Bruen. As the table below shows, all of the nation’s largest cities were living under some form of restrictive public carry regime by the end of the 19thĀ century. Many of these laws were enacted during Reconstruction, or soon after. Thomas not only ignores this evidence, but he also ignores recent scholarship showing thatĀ these laws were enforced in a racially neutral fashion for decades before white supremacists turned them against Black people.

Untitled

Unfortunately,Ā Bruen’s level of intellectual dishonesty and ignorance of basic legal historical method and well established facts easily located in readily accessible sources further undermines the legitimacy of the court at a moment when it canĀ ill affordĀ any further erosion in its standing.Ā BruenĀ may be a victory for gun rights advocates, but it is another example of a court in serious intellectual and moral decline.

A Footnote to “How To Fix a Lawless Supreme Court”

Two of the three law professors I quoted in this earlier postĀ believe the Constitution wouldn’t permit legislators to overrule a state’s voters and select their own slate of electors for the Electoral College, after the voters had already voted for president (or possibly without allowing the voters to vote at all). Leah Litman and Katherine Shaw briefly but forcefully argue this in a law journal article, “Textualism, Judicial Supremacy and the Independent State Legislature Theory” [p. 4].

The Independent State Legislature Theory (ISLT) is a fanciful idea being pushed by some Republicans that would give state legislatures total control over their state’s Electoral College votes. Even some members of the Supreme Court seem to like the idea, since it would allow gerrymandered legislatures in states like Wisconsin and North Carolina to help elect Republican presidents, regardless of who won the presidential election in their state. This is what Litman and Shaw say about it:

We do not offer a direct critique of a potential scenario in which a state legislature,Ā relying on Article II [of the Constitution], seeks to assign to itself the power to directly appoint presidential electors,Ā including after voters have cast their votes. That would, without doubt, represent one of the most high-stakes, antidemocratic, and lawless contexts in which a version—to be sure, a fringe version—of the ISLT might be deployed.

But, as far as we understand the rationales for such a move—which wasĀ reportedly considered and urged by a number of T____ advisors and supporters, including Ginni Thomas, in the aftermath of the 2020 election—they do not entail claims that state entities haveĀ misinterpreted state laws. They rest instead on the distinct claim that state legislatures’ authority toĀ prescribe the method of appointing presidential electors is plenary and unconstrained by basic notionsĀ of due process, democracy, or constitutional protections of the franchise. As profoundly misguided as such a claim is, debunking it is not our project here. Our focus is the independent state legislatureĀ theory, not its warped variant, the anti-democratic state legislature theory—which might be better described as the state-legislature-as-the-end-of-democracy theory.

I hope the Supreme Court Six agree with the professors (and the rest of the sane legal community) when the justices rule on Moore v. Harper in their next term. Given their recent track record, there’s no guarantee that they will.

How To Fix a Lawless Supreme Court

The Judiciary Act of 1869 “provided that theĀ Supreme Court of the United StatesĀ would consist of theĀ chief justice of the United StatesĀ and eightĀ associate justices [and] established separate judgeships for the U.S. circuit courts”.

There were nine circuit or appellate courts in 1869. The US population was around 38 million. Now there are thirteen circuits. The population is 338 million. We’ve also got a lot more laws and lawyers. A simple act of Congress, signed into law by the president, could add four justices to the Supreme Court, one for each circuit. Given the Court’s additional workload, simple arithmetic and common sense support adding four Supreme Court justices.

An added benefit would be that the president could nominate and the Senate could approve four justices who respect the Constitution and legal precedents; who don’t want to promote Christianity, patriarchy, white supremacy, plutocracy and the gun culture; and who don’t want to give corporations license to destroy the environment. In other words, seven honorable justices vs. the six dishonorable ones we have now.

I think that’s the best way to fix a lawless Supreme Court, although there are other possibilities (all, of course, assuming a Democratic House of Representatives and at least fifty Democratic senators go along).

Paul Waldman explains how states like California and New York are already working on new licensing requirements and the wide-ranging designation of what the Republican majority called “sensitive places” where guns can be prohibited:

[When you say] “the Supreme Court says I have the right to carry around this lethal instrument giving me the ability to murder anyone I encounter in an instant”, the rest of us are more than justified in responding: ā€œYes, that’s what the Supreme Court says. But we will take steps to protect ourselves from the danger you and other gun owners pose”….You’ll be able to get your guns, but just as you have to show you can operate a motor vehicle safely before getting a driver’s license, you’ll have to satisfy some requirements before getting a gun permit.

And just like you can’t drive your car on sidewalks or in grocery stores, you can’t take your gun anywhere you want. No doubt the Supreme Court Six will rule in favor of insanity, but, as Mr. Waldman says, some laws will survive, the legal process could take years and, meanwhile, lives will be saved.

Jamelle Bouie has written two columns on the same subject this week. From his second:

[Article 3, section 2 of] the Constitution tells us that the court’s appellate jurisdiction is subject to ā€œsuch Exceptionsā€ and ā€œunder such Regulationsā€ as ā€œthe Congress shall make.ā€ [But] the court’s appellate jurisdiction accounts for virtually everything it touches. And the Constitution says that Congress can regulate the nature of that jurisdiction. Congress can strip the court of its ability to hear certain cases, or it can mandate new rules for how the court decides cases where it has appellate jurisdiction.… It can even tell the court that it needs a supermajority of justices to declare a federal law or previous decision unconstitutional.

He then discusses the “Guarantee Clause” (Article 4, section 4″, which says that “the United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government”. A republic is generally considered to be a state in which supreme power is held by the people and their elected representatives, not by a monarch. Interestingly, courts have been reluctant to specify exactly what a republican form of government is, leaving that decision to Congress. Mr. Bouie continues:

[But we do have] Justice John Marshall Harlan’s famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, in which he condemns ā€œsinister legislationā€ passed to ā€œinterfere with the full enjoyment of the blessings of freedom, to regulate civil rights, common to all citizens, … and to place in a condition of legal inferiority a large body of American citizens, now constituting a part of the political community.ā€

This, he writes, ā€œis inconsistent with the guarantee given by the Constitution to each State of a republican form of government, and may be stricken down by congressional action, or by the courts in the discharge of their solemn duty to maintain the supreme law of the land.ā€

A Congress that wanted to could, in theory, use the Guarantee Clause to defend the basic rights of citizens against overbearing and tyrannical state governments. It’s been done before. After the Civil War, Radical Republicans in Congress found theirĀ constitutional powerĀ to reconstruct the South chiefly in the Guarantee Clause, which they used to protect the rights of Black Americans from revanchist state governments.

Ā As Mr. Bouie says in his first column:

The Supreme Court does not exist above the constitutional system… In the face of a reckless, reactionary and power-hungry court, Congress has options….The power to check the Supreme Court is there, in the Constitution. The task now is to seize it.

It’s almost impossible to imagine the 50 Democrats in today’s Senate all having the courage and understanding to seize the moment and reform the Supreme Court (one of them who’s against reforming the filibuster is rumored to have killed a proposed surtax on incomes over 10 million dollars, I suppose because of her support for the working class).

But it looks like a terrible crisis may be approaching. Three law professors write in today’s Washington Post about a case the Court has agreed to hear later this year, Moore v. Harper:

Just three years ago, a 5-to-4 Supreme CourtĀ prohibitedĀ federal courts from addressing whether extreme partisan gerrymandering violates the Constitution. But don’t worry, the court said, state courts can curb the practice if they conclude it violatesĀ stateĀ constitutions.

HarperĀ invites the Supreme Court to go back on that promise. This invitation is based on an unsupportable legal claim known as theĀ independent state legislature theory (ISLT). The theory would disable state courts from protecting voting rights in federal elections.

In theory (and given the recklessness of the Republican majority), the Court might rule that state legislatures have absolute authority to determine how their states vote for president. State legislators could ignore the voters and appoint whoever they wanted to represent their state in the Electoral College.

The outcome in 2024 is a virtual clone of the 2020 election: Biden carries the same states he did that year and DeSantis gets [the rest]. Biden is going to the White House for another four years.

Until the announcement comes out of Georgia. Although Biden won the popular vote in Georgia, their legislature decided it can overrule the popular vote and just awarded the state’s 16 electoral votes to DeSantis.

We then hear from five other states with Republican-controlled legislatures where Biden won the majority of the vote: North Carolina, Wisconsin, Michigan, Pennsylvania and Arizona.

CNN announces that DeSantis has won the election….Ā