Police Reform and Fake Capitalism (They’re Not Related)

Calling the police can be dangerous. New Jersey is doing something about it. The state created a program called ARRIVE Together. A mental health professional accompanies the police when they go out on a call involving someone in mental distress. A study showed that in 342 such cases, only 3% resulted in the use of force and only 2% resulted in an arrest (usually because of an unrelated issue, such as an outstanding warrant). The program is being expanded and should serve as a model for police departments around the country (see this report from the Brookings Institution).

So much for some good news. Now back to harsh reality. From The Guardian:

One of the most deeply held and frequently heard propositions about capitalism is that it revolves around private companies and individuals taking risks. When, earlier this year, the US government arranged a rescue package for Silicon Valley Bank, for instance, among the many objections to it was the claim that the rescue contravened capitalism’s risk norms.

This view of the world directly informs wide swaths of economic policymaking today….But examine the economy, and it becomes clear: capitalism has become less and less about corporate risk-taking in recent decades. To be sure, many businesses do take significant risks. The independent small business owner who opens a new cafe in London generally faces intense competition and massive risk. But as political scientist Jacob Hacker has argued, business in general has been enormously skilled in recent times at offloading risk – principally by dumping it on those least able to bear it: ordinary households.

… The best example of a business usually regarded as being fundamentally about risk-taking, but which in fact is not, is … alternative asset management, an umbrella term for hedge funds, private equity and the like. (“Alternative” here means anything other than publicly listed stocks and bonds.) Asset managers are anything but marginal, exotic firms – they manage more than $100 trillion of clients’ money globally and control everything from [Benihana to PetSmart to Westinghouse].

But let’s look at what asset management companies in places like Britain and the US actually do. Three considerations are paramount.

First, there is the matter of whose capital is put at risk when alternative asset managers such as Citadel, Blackstone and KKR invest. In large part, it’s not theirs. The proportion of equity invested by a typical hedge or private equity fund that is the asset manager’s own is usually between 1% and 3%. The rest is that of their external investor clients (the “limited partners”), which include pension funds.

Second, consider how an asset manager’s investments are designed. For one thing, its own financial participation in, and management of, its investment funds is usually through a vehicle (the “general partnership”) that is constituted as a separate entity, precisely in order to insulate the firm and its professionals from liability risk.

Furthermore, the fund and its manager is generally distanced from underlying investments by a chain of intermediary holding companies that protect it from the risk inherent in those investments. In leveraged buyouts, where money is borrowed to help finance a deal,the debt goes on to the balance sheet of the company the fund has acquired. This means if trouble arises in repaying the debt, it is not the investment fund that is on the hook, still less its manager.

Third and last, fee structures also distance asset managers from risk. If a fund underperforms, they may earn no performance fee (based on fund profits), but they do have the considerable consolation – a form of risk insurance, if you like – of the guaranteed management fee, usually representing about 2% of limited partners’ committed capital, year after year. Essentially, management fees pay asset managers’ base salaries; performance fees pay bonuses.

In short, then, it would be far-fetched to suggest that what hedge funds and the like do amounts substantially to risk-taking. The only meaningful risk they themselves face is that of losing customers if fund returns prove underwhelming…. In reality, the business of alternative asset management is less about taking on risk than, in Hacker’s terms, moving it elsewhere. So when things go wrong, others bear the brunt….

Why does this matter? Because unless elected policymakers understand how risk is produced and distributed in modern economies, they will not be in a position to act appropriately and proportionately. That is why vague talk from politicians of being “pro-business” or “entrepreneurship” mean so little; the point is to learn from economic realities as they actually are, as opposed to how economics textbooks say they could or should be.

There is one very obvious policy recommendation for alternative asset management that flows from our understanding what they actually do with “risk”: taxing them more.

The main performance fee earned by alternative asset managers is “carried interest” – effectively, a profit share. In the UK and US, most asset management firms pay tax on this revenue at the capital gains rate, rather than the usually higher income tax rate. This is because the asset manager has typically been understood to be “taking on the entrepreneurial risk of the [investment]” – a standard justification for taxation as capital gain.

But as we have seen, this simply does not hold water. In 2017, the New York Times called the beneficial tax treatment of carried interest “a tax loophole for the rich that just won’t die”. It’s time to close it….

Note: To pass Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act last year, Democrats needed Sen. Kyrsten Sinema’s vote. But she wouldn’t vote for the bill unless Democrats dropped the provision that would have closed the carried interest loophole. She insisted on preserving the tax break that favors the securities and investment industry. Wouldn’t you know that hedge fund managers and private equity executives gave her more than $2 million between 2018 and 2022? Since then, she left the Democratic Party to run in Arizona as an “Independent” [CNBC].

Fear vs. the White Male Effect

There was a story in the news a little while ago about a Democrat or two fearing that impeaching our criminal president again would cause more division in our beleaguered nation. So I decided to do a small, very unscientific study of a possible difference between Democrats and Republicans. My hypothesis was that Democrats are often said to be afraid of something, while Republicans rarely are. Here are the results (which may be hard to see, so I’ll summarize them below):

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Google came back with 483,000 results for “democrats fear” but only 184,000 results for “republicans fear”. That’s an impressive difference.

To rule out the possibility that Google simply has more results about Democrats, I did another search. I compared “democrats refuse” and “republicans refuse” (simply because Republicans seem to say “no” a lot).

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As you may be able to see, there were equally striking results. There were 86,000 results for “democrats refuse” and 314,000 for “republicans refuse”. 

What does this tell us about the two parties? I’m not sure. Maybe Democrats are more concerned about consequences than Republicans are. They probably worry more. They are certainly more open to compromise, i.e. less likely to refuse. 

This brings me to two relevant articles. The first describes a significant difference between White men and everybody else. It’s called “The Science That Explains Trump’s Grip on White Males”:

Cognitive scientists long ago coined a term for the psychological forces that have given rise to the gendered and racialized political divide that we’re seeing today. That research, and decades of subsequent scholarly work, suggest that if you want to understand the Txxxx phenomenon, you’d do well to first understand the science of risk perception.

[In 1994] a group of researchers . . .  published a study that asked about 1,500 Americans across the country how they perceived different kinds of risks, notably environmental health risks. [They] found that White males differed from White women and non-White men and women in how they perceived risks. For every category of threat, White men saw risk as much smaller and much more acceptable than did other demographic groups. This is what they dubbed “the White male effect”. They also found that White women perceived risks, across the board, to be much higher than White men did, but this was not true of non-White women and men, who perceived risk at pretty much the same levels. . .  Eventually, expansions of this study would include a wide range of risks including handguns, abortion, nuclear threat, and capital punishment.

The perception of risk, of course, relates to fear. Where there is no risk, there is nothing to fear. There is scientific evidence, therefore, that Republicans (who tend to be White men) are less fearful than Democrats (who tend to be women and non-White).

The second article is “The Democrats’ Stark, Historic Choice”. The author argues that Democrats need to rise above their fears if we’re going to preserve (what remains of) our democracy:

For all the cant we’ll soon be drowned in about the soul of the nation and healing, the Democratic Party and the country now face what is ultimately a problem of public policy. Today, less than half our population controls 82 percent of the Senate’s seats. By 2040, given current demographic trends, the most conservative third of the country alone will control nearly 70 percent of its seats. All of this amounts to a permanent and growing advantage for a party whose leaders greeted the president with applause at its winter meeting after Wednesday’s attack.

The Democrats will soon have the presidency. They will have the House of Representatives. By the skin on the skin of their teeth, they will have the Senate. They will, in sum, be entering into an alignment of power in Washington that we have every reason to believe is becoming exceptionally rare. And every actor within that trifecta will have a choice to make. Should a party that mounted a crusade against a legitimate election and the democratic process—a party whose rhetoric has killed—continue to accrue structural power? Or should the Democratic Party work to curb it? 

The author goes on to argue that Democrats need to overcome their fear of institutional change and take aggressive advantage of their fragile Congressional majority. The legislative filibuster should be eliminated in order to pass a full restoration of the Voting Rights Act, expand the franchise, grant statehood to Washington, D.C., and Puerto Rico, and reform the Supreme Court.

As always, the Republicans will refuse to accept small-“d” democratic reforms. The Democrats shouldn’t fear doing whatever they can to achieve them.