Tag Archives: Ethics

Noncognitivism in Ethics by Mark Schroeder

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Non-cognitivism (with or without the hyphen) in ethics is the view that ethical statements do not describe features of actions or agents, but rather express attitudes of the speaker regarding those actions or agents. Quoting the philosopher Simon Blackburn: “Hence, it is supposed, there is nothing ethical to know, for knowledge aims to track or represent independent truths about things” (The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy). Mark Schroeder describes non-cognitivism, less clearly, as a non-descriptivist view that seeks “to explain the meaning of words by other means than by saying what they are about”.

Schroeder analyzes a number of 20th century non-cognitivist theories, including emotivism, prescriptivism and expressivism. He finds all of them lacking in various ways, especially in their failure to adequately explain how we actually use ethical language and reason about ethical subjects. But he also believes that non-cognitivist theories correctly draw attention to the fact that there is more to meaning than truth-conditions.

It seems to me that non-cognitivist theories are basically correct, but in a limited sense. We cannot analyze ethical statements in terms of attitudes, as some non-cognitivists (used to) do. For example, “Stealing is wrong” does not literally mean anything like “I disapprove of stealing and everyone else should too”. “Stealing is wrong” means that stealing conflicts with the moral rules. But what such a statement means in another sense, i.e. what we can conclude when someone says that stealing is wrong, is that the speaker has a certain negative attitude toward stealing and thinks that other people should have the same attitude. This is what it “means” or shows when someone says that stealing is wrong, although “stealing is wrong” has a different literal meaning. 

It’s obvious that ethical statements aren’t descriptions; they’re evaluations. They say how the world should be, not how it is, even though many of them are grammatically similar to descriptions and have literal meanings that imply that they are descriptive of some state of affairs, i.e. that some action is in harmony or conflict with certain moral rules or that some agent tends to obey or disobey those rules. Stating that an action is in conflict with a rule sounds like a description and has the force of a description — that is such a statement’s literal meaning. But making such a statement is evidence for a different state of affairs; it means that the speaker is opposed to the action in question and thinks other people should oppose it too.  (10/23/11)

The Sources of Normativity by Christine M. Korsgaard

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Professor Korsgaard argues that ethical normativity or value results from autonomous agents like ourselves reflecting on what we ought to do and then endorsing a rational course of action, i.e., a course of action based on reasons we can truthfully endorse. This is “reflective endorsement”. Actions and the reasons for those actions are good if they are well-considered and promote our “practical identity”, the conception of ourselves as valuable beings with lives worth living. And since we value our own humanity, we should value the humanity of others as well. 

Korsgaard says that obligations only exist in the first-person perspective: “in one sense, the obligatory is like the visible: it depends on how much of the light of reflection is on”. She also believes that we are subject to moral laws that we ourselves create (until we as individuals change those laws).  

She admits, however, that her argument will fail to convince someone who is completely skeptical about morality. She does not provide a non-moral foundation for morality (who could?). What Korsgaad does provide is an explanation of the role morality plays in our lives and how trying to be moral contributes to our self-image as proper human beings. 

Included in the book are responses from four well-known philosophers. I thought that their criticisms were more sensible and understandable than Korsgaard’s replies.  (5/2/11)

Moral Clarity: a Guide for Grown-Up Idealists by Susan Neiman

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Abraham did the right thing when he argued with God about God’s intention to kill everyone in Sodom and Gomorrah (not when he agreed to sacrifice his son Isaac). By standing up for his ethical ideals in opposition to the demands of his religion, Abraham foreshadowed the values of the Enlightenment.

Neiman believes that we should adopt certain key Enlightenment values, in opposition to cultural trends on both the right and the left (but mostly the right). She focuses on happiness, reason, reverence and hope. She contends that Enlightenment thinkers understood the limitations of reason. They also realized that progress is not inevitable. But thinkers like Kant showed the way to a universalist morality that favors reason over tradition, knowledge over superstition, and hope over fear.  (12/26/10)

Being Good: A Short Introduction to Ethics by Simon Blackburn

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It is rather short, and not as satisfying as Blackburn’s Truth. The book is divided into three parts. The first deals with seven threats to ethics, such as the Death of God, Relativism and Determinism. The second deals with some ethical ideas, such as Utilitarianism and Rights. And the third discusses possible foundations for ethics, like those offered by Kant and Rawls.

Blackburn is skeptical about providing a rational foundation for ethics, somehow “built into the order of things”, but argues that it is good enough that, as social beings, we can share an ethical framework based on sympathy for each other. This framework allows us to reason about ethics, but only within that framework.  (3/19/10)

Flora, Fauna and Ethics

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Having spent many hours hacking away at vines and thorn bushes recently, I was especially interested in a recent TV program called What Plants Talk About. It turns out that plants behave like animals in many respects. For example, they hunt for food, although much more slowly than most animals. They also respond to injuries, sometimes by summoning assistance (for example, by releasing chemicals that attract predators who eat the bugs who are eating the plant). They even nurture their offspring in some cases.

This doesn’t mean that the plants do these things “on purpose”. They behave in ways that have been beneficial to their species. Of course, we believe that we do things “on purpose”.  But we‘re products of evolution too. We might not be so very different from plants and other animals.

Coincidentally, after watching What Plants Talk About, I came across a review of a book called Plant-Thinking: A Philosophy of Vegetal Life. The author of the book apparently believes that plants have suffered from “ethical neglect” at the hands of us humans. The reviewer congratulates the author for “forcefully inserting the question of vegetable life into the mix of contemporary ethical discourse in philosophy”.

The idea that plants deserve ethical consideration sounds odd. Some philosophers would say that plants don’t need to be treated ethically, since they aren’t conscious. They don’t have nervous systems like us and presumably don’t feel pain. Yet they are living things. Should we avoid cutting down redwood trees or rose bushes simply because we appreciate their beauty or because they are part of the ecosystem? Or do they have the right to be left alone?

Nobody, even the author of Plant-Thinking, thinks that we shouldn’t eat plants. But perhaps we are obliged to treat them with respect. Maybe I shouldn’t have cut down all those vines and thorn bushes. I certainly don’t like the idea that they were calling for help as I cut them to pieces.

What Plants Talk About is here:

http://www.pbs.org/wnet/nature/episodes/what-plants-talk-about/preview/8228/

The book review is here (although I don’t recommend reading it — there is too much philosophical jargon): 

http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/39002-plant-thinking-a-philosophy-of-vegetal-life/